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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(j) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Defendants agree with Plaintiffs' "Statement of the Issue"
in this case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the present case, Defendants agree with Plaintiffs'
statement of the "Standard of Review."
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES
In the present case, Defendants assent that the cases and
statutes cited in Plaintiffs' "Determinative Statutes and Cases"
are relevant and must be considered.

In addition, Defendants

incorporate two other cases which also must be heeded, Lamarr v.
Utah State Dept. of Transp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
and Thimmes v. Utah State University, 417 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah
Ct. App. 2001), attached hereto as Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants agree with a majority of Plaintiffs' ''Statement
of the Case."
and delivered

It must be noted that Plaintiffs never

directed

their notice of claim to the Kane County Clerk.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The bottom line in this case, is that Plaintiffs did

not

strictly comply with the statutory requirements of the Utah
1

Governmental Immunity Act, thus, the trial court's dismissal of
Plaintiffs' claim was proper and required.
In their brief, Plaintiffs do not

deny that they failed to

direct and deliver the notice of claim to the county clerk as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13.

In fact, Plaintiffs have

admitted that they have only substantially complied.

Rather,

Plaintiffs have attempted to argue that although they did not
follow the explicit language of the statutes and directed and
delivered their notice of claim to the county clerk, it was
eventually received by the county clerk's office, and substantial
compliance with § 13 was sufficient.
It is clear that the rule regarding the notice requirements
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is that of strict
compliance.

As in this case, where § 13 of the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act is clear on its face as to who the notice of claim
should be directed and delivered to, there is no need to
interpret and manipulate legislative intent.

Section 13

specifically states that when bringing a claim against a county,
the notice of claim must be directed

and delivered

to the

county

clerk.
Plaintiffs submit that because the Kane County's retained
counsel corresponded with them even though their notice was
deficient, they met the overall purpose of § 63-30-13, and that
Defendants should have been estopped from moving for dismissal,
2

Plaintiffs are wrong.
estoppel.

Defendants' actions do not bring rise to

First, Defendants' counsel specifically stated that

correspondence with her neither confirmed, accepted, or validated
sufficiency of their notice.

Second, Defendants never

acknowledged or instructed Plaintiffs that the service of the
notice of claim to the commissioners was sufficient.

Third, the

county attorney never represented that he had the authority to
instruct, nor did he do so, or even indicate that the deliverance
of the notice to the commission was sufficient to satisfy the
statutory requirements.
Further, this Court has been very explicit in declaring that
strict compliance is the law.

In fact, as recently as March,

2001, it has been proclaimed so.
on which they reach to rely.

Plaintiffs have only two cases

However, the court stated, even in

those cases, that strict compliance is the law and that only
because of very specific facts, did they reach what seems to be a
more flexible holding of the law.

Plaintiffs' reliance on these

cases and facts are misplaced.
Additionally, Defendants motion to dismiss was based on the
fact that Plaintiffs failed to follow the statutory procedures
which are required

in order to commence a suit.

Plaintiffs

assert that further discovery should have been allowed.

However,

Plaintiffs' argument is inappropriate as Defendants moved the
trial court to dismiss based on lack of subject matter

3

jurisdiction, therefore, Rule 56(f) is inappropriate.

Again, the

trial court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' suit and in not
approving additional discovery.
Finally, Plaintiffs have argued that this Court should now
adjust the law to make it one of "substantial compliance."
Again, this Court has declared over and over again that strict
compliance is the law and Plaintiffs have not offered any
compelling reason to deviate from what has advanced justice for
over twenty-five years.

Furthermore, this is not the correct

forum in which to seek an adjustment of the statute.

Any change

must be legislatively mandated.
The trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and this Court should affirm
its holding.
ARGUMENT

I.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM IS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THEY
DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT'S
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 explicitly state, in

relevant part:
§ 1 3 : A claim against a political
subdivision, or against its employee . . .,
is barred
unless notice of claim is filed
with the governing
body of the political

subdivision according

to the requirements

Section
63-30-11
within one year after the
claim arises, . . .
§ 11: (b) The notice of claim shall be:
4

of

(ii) directed

and delivered

to:

(B) the county clerk,
when the claim is
against a county; (Emphasis added).
See Appellants' Addendum A
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that strict
compliance of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is required.
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999),
(see Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482
(Utah 1972) (The Court stated "[w]e have consistently held that
where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance
with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right to
maintain a suit.").
Further, this Court has held that when interpreting a
statute, the plain language is first examined.

State v. Vigil,

842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992), Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
911 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
u

This Court stated that

[w]e will resort to other methods of statutory interpretation

only if we find the language of the statutes to be ambiguous."
Vigil, at 845.

In Bellonio, regarding § 13 of the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act, the Court of Appeals of Utah found
they need look no further than the statute's plain language.
Bellonio, at 1296.

"The plain meaning of section 13 is that a

claim against a political subdivision is "barred" unless notice
is filed with the "governing body," which is enumerated in § 6330-11, within one year of the claim arising."

Id.

As recently

as this year, courts have already declared twice, that the notice
5

provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act are to be strictly
construed and full compliance with its requirements is a
condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit.

Thimmes v.

Utah State University, 417 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 2001),
Great West Casualty v. Utah Department of Transportation, 415
Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 1
Plaintiffs' Delivery Of Their Notice Was NOT Legally Sufficient.
In their Brief, Plaintiffs' basis for this appeal is that
the trial court was estopped from dismissing their case and was
incorrect in doing so because their notice was eventually
received by employees of the county clerk's office, and such
action fulfilled the overall purpose and intent of § 63-30-13.
Plaintiffs argument is premised on three cases, Brittain v. State
by and through Utah Department of Employment, 882 P.2d 666

(Utah

Ct. App. 1994), Bischel v. Merit, 907 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App.
1995), and Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Utah
1980).

However, Plaintiffs' reliance on the above cases is

misplaced and the facts are distinguishable to the facts of the
case at hand.
In Brittain, the court determined that where the plaintiff
directed and delivered their notice of claim to Risk Management
l

It must be noted that in the Great West Casualty decision,
Judge Orme expressed frustration that any change to the state's
"immunity scheme" cannot be resolved in this forum, and is an issue
for the legislature, not the courts. See Appellees' Argument III
in this Brief.
6

and the attorney general, the requirements of § 63-3 0-12 were
satisfied. At the time of Brittain's holding, § 12 provided:
A claim against the state, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the attorney general and the
agency concerned within one year after the
claim arises. Brittain, at 669 (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993)
However the court the court in Bellonio distinguished Brittain in
one respect, because it was a case involving § 12 rather than §
13.

Bellonio, at 1297.

The case was further distinguished facts

by reasoning that while the court found it "reasonable" to
construe Risk Management as the "agency concerned" as set forth
in § 12, § 13 contained no language that the city's legal counsel
was entitled to the notice.

Id.

In Bischel, the court found a notice of claim sufficient
where the plaintiff directed and delivered notice to the county
attorney as opposed to the county commission.

The plaintiff did

not know who serve, so she called the commission to ask.

In

response the plaintiff was instructed to direct and deliver her
notice to the Salt Lake County Attorney.

It must be noted that

at the time of Bischel, the notice requirements of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act were more ambiguous than they are under
the present code.

When Bischel was decided, § 13 stated that a

claim against a political subdivision "is barred unless notice is

7

filed with the governing

body

of the political subdivision within

one year after the claim arises."
Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993).

Bischel, at 277 (quoting Utah

The court stated in its

distinguishment, that,
Thus, the end result in Bischel was not based
upon a substantial compliance or constructive
notice theory, but rather was founded upon
the apparent agency of the commission
employee. Bischel at 1298.
In Stahl, the statute at issue was not even the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

Rather, the issue was whether or not

the plaintiff had fulfilled the thirty day notice as required by
the Utah Public Transit Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-20-56.
at 480-81.

Stahl,

This Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss

because the Utah Public Transit Act did not contain an express
bar against maintaining an action for noncompliance and found the
plaintiff's substantial compliance sufficient.

Id. at 481-82.

This Court declared that "generally a direction in a statute to
do an act is considered "mandatory" when consequences are
attached to the failure to act.

Id. at 481-82.

Taken

conversely, this statement means that the legislature intended to
bar actions for noncompliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act's notice requirements.2

2

It must be noted that Stahl, a 1980 case, is neither binding
or controlling.
8

A binding and more factually similar case is that of
Bellonio.

In Bellonio, the plaintiff argued that constructive

notice, coupled with substantial compliance was sufficient but
the court disagreed.

Bellonio, at 1296.

In the Bellonio case,

the plaintiff tripped and fell in the parking terrace at the Salt
Lake Airport on June 14, 1992.

Bellonio's first attorney

informed the insurance carrier that he was plaintiff's counsel,
this information was forwarded to Robert M. Kern, the airport's
legal counsel.

Mr. Kern instructed that any further

correspondence should come to his office.

Id. at 1295.

Bellonio retained a second attorney who engaged in a number
of correspondences between the plaintiff and Mr. Kern, and then
on March 24, 1993, directed and delivered a notice of claim to
Mr. Kern.

Mr. Kern acknowledged receipt and indicated that he

was awaiting further reports.

On July 11, Bellonio directed and

delivered his notice of claim to the Utah Attorney General, the
Salt Lake City Attorney, and the Airport Director, but not upon
Salt Lake City's Mayor or the Salt Lake City Council.

Id.

On June 14, 1993, Bellonio's third attorney filed a
complaint against Salt Lake City and the Airport.

The trial

court dismissed Bellonio's claim against the airport but not
against Salt Lake City.

The City brought an interlocutory appeal

seeking dismissal because Bellonio failed to strictly comply with

9

the notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

Id.

As in this case, Bellonio attempted to rely on Brittain and
Bischel and argued that since Mr. Kern had told him to direct all
correspondence to him, that dismissal would be inappropriate.
However the court relied on the fact that while the airport's
attorney did request that all communication be sent to him, he
never indicated that he was the proper agent to receive the
notice of claim.

The court further held that Bischel was not

persuasive because Mr. Kern was never the agent of the mayor of
the city or the council.

Regarding Bellonio's reliance on

Brittain and Bischel, the court declared that:
[w]hile . . . it may seem to indicate a
flexible rule of constructive notice to
governmental entities, this is not
the
general
rule in this
state.
Bellonio, at 1297
(emphasis added).
Further, the court set forth:
[T]he precedential effect of [these] cases is
limited by their unique factual underpinnings
and therefore, neither should be construed
as
an indication
that we are prepared
to
abrogate
the longstanding
rule
requiring
strict
compliance
with all aspects
of
the
Governmental
Immunity
Act.
Id. (emphasis
added).
The court also noted that Bellonio "never even attempted to
direct his notice of claim to the proper party, i.e., the mayor
of the city council."

Bellonio, at 1298.
10

In their holding, the

court found that Bellonio's claim was barred since he did not
file the required notice of claim set forth in § 63-30-13.
In the instant case, the explicit language of §§ 63-30-11
and 63-30-13 state that the notice of claim must be directed and
delivered to the county clerk when a county is being sued.
Appellants' Brief, Addendum A.

See

In correspondences dated February

11, 1999, Plaintiffs directed and delivered their notice of claim
to the Kane County Commissioners: Stephen R. Crosby, Joe C. Judd,
and Norman Carroll.
Plaintiffs never

See Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, Addendum C.

directed

and delivered

or even attempted to

direct and deliver a notice of claim to the Kane County Clerk,
nor do they dispute that they did so.

Also, Defendants never

instructed or even indicated to the Plaintiffs that the Kane
County Commission was the proper agent to receive their notice of
claim.

Further, Plaintiffs never inquired if their notice was

sufficient.

Moreover, a letter from Linette Hutton, Defendants'

counsel, dated March 8, 1999, was exact in stating that their
receipt of the notice of claim did not accept, deny, confirm or
verify sufficiency of the claim.
D.

See Plaintiffs' Brief, Addendum

In light of this language, it is incredulous to contend that

Ms. Hutton represented herself or the commission as Kane County's
agent for purposes of the notice requirements.

11

Thus, the trial court was correct in finding that Plaintiffs
did not comply with the statutory notice requirements, which
resulted in the proper dismissal of their claim.
The County Attorney Did Not Have The Authority To Confirm The
Person To Possess And Act Upon The Notice of Claim.
Plaintiffs argue further that Kane County Attorney, Colin
Winchester's correspondence confirmed Kane County's legal
counsel, Linette B. Hutton as who should possess and act upon the
notice.
Again, Plaintiffs' erroneously rely on Bischel, and point to
a March 20, 1999 letter from Mr. Winchester which stated in
relevant part that "Kane County has turned the claim over to its
claim adjustors, who have in turn retained Linette B. Hutton.
Please direct all further correspondence to Ms. Hutton," See
Appellants' Brief, Addendum E.
In light of the language in Ms. Hutton's letter as well as
the decision on this exact issue in Bellonio3, , it was not

3

In Bellonio, plaintiff's claims against Salt Lake City were
dismissed because he filed a notice of claim with the airport's
attorney. Prior to filing any notice, Plaintiff was instructed to
address all correspondence to the airport's attorney.
Based on
these facts, the plaintiff argued that his reliance and substantial
compliance was sufficient.
The Court of Appeals disagreed and
stated [w]hile it is clear that [the airport's attorney] did make
such a request, he never indicated, either expressly or impliedly,
that he was the proper agent to receive the statuory notice of
claim, nor did [plainitff] request from him any information
regarding Governmental Immunity Act Compliance. Bellonio, at 1298.

12

reasonable for Plaintiffs to believe Mr. Winchester's instruction
to address all further correspondence to Ms. Hutton made their
notice sufficient and effective.

As argued above, neither Ms.

Hutton or Mr. Winchester represented that notice was sufficient.
In fact, Ms. Hutton went one step further than the airport's
attorney in Bellonio, and declared in her letter that
correspondence with her did

not

validate sufficiency of notice.

Further, it must be noted that even though Plaintiffs tout that
they believed Mr. Winchester and Ms. Hutton to have had authority
to act on behalf of Kane County, Plaintiffs never attempted to
direct and deliver a notice of claim to either of them.
All Plaintiffs' reasoning and argument does not obviate the
fact that they did not comply with the notice requirements.

For

these reasons, the trial court's decision must be affirmed.
II.

IT WAS PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFFS'
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY SINCE THE CLAIM WAS
DISMISSED DUE TO THE COURT'S LACK OF JURISDICTION.
In their brief, Plaintiffs state that "when matters outside

the pleadings under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
are considered, the motion is properly treated as one for summary
judgment under rule 56."

See Appellants' Brief at p. 19.

In

this case, the court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss based
on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, therefore, Rule 56(f)
is inapplicable.

See R. at 165-167.

13

The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly held that the
statutory notice requirement is " a jurisdictional requirement
and a precondition to suit."

Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of

Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988).

In Lamarr, the court

granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and found the
agency immune as per the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and
plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff argued that the notice issue

was not properly before the court because the notice issue was an
affirmative defense and not properly pleaded in defendant's
answer.

Lamarr, at 540.

Plaintiff argued further that since the

defendant did not ask the court to rule on the notice issue in
their summary judgment motion, the court could not rule on it.
Id.

The court declared that the plaintiff's argument

"misconstrues the nature of the statutory notice of claim
requirement."
required

Id.

The court in Lamarr announced that it was

to dismiss the claim against the defendant because it

lacked jurisdiction.

Id.

In the present case, while Defendants did provide an
affidavit in support of their Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs have
misrepresented the law regarding this motion.
56(f) is inapplicable to the present case.

Therefore, Rule

Here, Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss was not based on grounds that Plaintiff did not
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

14

Defendants moved

the court to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

R. 20-29.

Since

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for treatment of
Rule (b)(1) motions as motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs'
appeal on this issue is inappropriate.
Likewise, the trial court relied upon sufficient evidence to
determine that the Plaintiffs did not satisfy the notice
requirement as set forth in § 13.

Plaintiffs do not

dispute that

they failed to direct and deliver their notice of claim to the
Kane County Clerk.

Moreover, Plaintiffs have been in full

possession of all correspondence between themselves and Kane
County, and any further information was and is irrelevant as to
whether they fulfilled the statutory requirements of § 13.
Because the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for
treatment of Rule 12(b)(1) motions as motions for summary
judgment, Plaintiffs attempt to color the dismissal for other
reasons than jurisdictional to invoke Rule 56(f) discovery
procedures is inappropriate.

The trial court was required

to

dismiss Plaintiffs' claims and did so appropriately without
allowing further discovery.
III. STRICT COMPLIANCE IS THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
In Plaintiffs' last issue on appeal, they contend that this
Court should now overturn the long standing law of strict
compliance and find substantial compliance adequate.
15

The

gravamen of Plaintiffs' complaint is that when the purpose and
intent of the statute are met, regardless of how or who the
notice of claim is directed and delivered to, then notice should
be effective.
The landmark case of Scarborough, this Court explicitly
stated that:
The purpose of statutes requiring the
presentation of claims to political
subdivisions prior to filing a suit is in
furtherance of public policy to prevent
unnecessary litigation. The purpose of the
notice provisions is to afford the political
subdivision an opportunity to investigate the
claim while the matter is of recent memory,
witnesses are yet available, conditions have
not been materially changed and to determine
if there is liability, and if there is the
extent of it.
Additionally, in a most recent decision dealing with § 13, the
Utah Court of Appeals in Great West Casualty recognized that the
judicial forum is not the place to adjust the strict compliance
rule and refused to do so.

The court stated:

[s]uch an adjustment in the philosophy
underlying our State's sovereign immunity
scheme must, however, come at the hands of
the Legislature and not this Court. Great
West Casualty, at 27-28.
Further, even more recently than Great West Casualty, the Utah
Court of Appeals announced again
compliance is the rule.

in Thimmes that strict

In Thimmes, the plaintiff was not sure

who to direct and deliver her notice to, so she called an unknown
individual at the Utah Attorney General's Office.
16

Plaintiff

contends that someone, although she could not say who, instructed
her to direct and deliver her notice of claim to Risk Management.
Id.

Thimmes argued that Bischel applied and because she was

instructed by a state agent to direct and deliver her notice of
claim to Risk Management.
u

However, the court found that the

[a]ppellant ha[d] not presented sufficient evidence to justify

her reliance on the advice of an unnamed state employee rather
than the plain language of section 63-30-12."

Id.

The court

noted their decision in Bellonio and indicated that u[w]e pointed
to the unique factual circumstances of Bischel and said our
decision in that case should not be viewed as an "abrogat[ion of]
the long-standing rule requiring strict compliance with
aspects of the Governmental Immunity Act."

all

Id. (citing Bellonio,

at 1297)(emphasis added).
For over twenty-five years, from Scarborough in 1975 to
Great West Casualty and Thimmes in 2 0 01, the courts have
recognized and respected a rule of strict compliance of all
aspects of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, specifically the
notice requirements.

The Immunity Act has evolved from a

substandard substantial compliance rule to a more effective,
strict compliance standard, which has become a rule affording and
promoting justice and equity as § 63-30-13 explicitly sets forth
requirements and the consequences for failure to follow them.

17

As

stated above, in decisions that seem to make the rule more
flexible, it has been declared that:
[w]hile . . . it may seem to indicate a
flexible rule of constructive notice to
governmental entities, this is not
the
general
rule in this state.
Bellonio, at 12 97
(emphasis added).
Further, the court set forth:
[T]he precedential effect of [these] cases is
limited by their unique factual underpinnings
and therefore, neither should be construed
as
an indication
that we are prepared
to
abrogate
the longstanding
rule
requiring
strict
compliance
with all aspects
of
the
Governmental
Immunity
Act.
Id. (emphasis
added).
Strict compliance has been declared the law in order to make
sure that the proper entities know that they are being sued and
so they are able to prepare for litigation.

If the courts had to

determine in each and every case whether notice requirements had
been substantially complied with, our already limited judicial
resources would be wasted.
In this case, Plaintiffs have admitted that they have only
substantially complied with required notice requirements, so now
in a last ditch effort they are reaching to this Court to
overturn a well defined mandated rule to reach sufficiency in
order to reverse the trial courts decision and remand the issue
for trial.

For the foregoing reasons and since this Court is not

the proper forum in which to adjust the strict compliance rule,

18

the strict compliance standard must be upheld making anything
less deficient.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiffs admittedly did not strictly comply with
the requirements set forth in § 63-30-13 and direct and deliver
their notice of claim with the Kane County Clerk within the one
year statutory time period, the trial court had to dismiss
Plaintiffs claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

For

the foregoing reasons, the trial court was correct in dismissing
Plaintiffs' claims and its decision must me upheld.
DATED on this JJP

day of April, 2001.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY

PETER STIRBA
^
^
AIMEE K. MARTINEZ
Attorneys for Appellees
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breach of the duty was the proximate cause of
plaintiffs injury, and that there was injury.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nicholas LAMARR, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, and Salt Lake City,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 910600-CA.
March 26, 1992.
Pedestrian who was struck while walking across
overpass brought action against city and Department
of Transportation. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., granted
defendants' motions for summary judgment and
pedestrian appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings,
Associate P.J., held that: (1) Sidewalk Construction
Act did not require city to maintain sidewalk along
overpass which was a state road on which state had
placed pedestrian walkway; (2) city owed no special
duty to pedestrian to control transients who allegedly
prevented him from using the pedestrian walkway;
and (3) pedestrian was required to serve notice of
claim on both Department of Transportation and the
Attorney General.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Courts <®^99(3)
106 —
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
10611(G) Rules of Decision
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case as Law
of the Case
106k99(3) Jurisdiction, Dismissal, Nonsuit, and
Summary Judgment, Rulings Relating To.
Trial court's earlier denial of defendant's motion for
summary judgment did not preclude the court from
revisiting the issue and later granting summary
judgment.
[2] Negligence <®^202
272 --2721 In General
272k202 Elements in General.
(Formerly 272kl)
Four elements which plaintiff must establish to state
claim of negligence are that defendant owed plaintiff
a duty, that defendant breached the duty, that the
Copyright (c) West Group 2000

[3] Highways <&* 198
200 —
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel
200IX(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions
200k 198 Liabilities of Local Authorities and
Officers.
Provision of the Sidewalk Construction Act allowing
city to use certain funds for construction of curbs,
gutters, sidewalks, and pedestrian safety devices did
not impose mandatory duty on city to construct
sidewalk on overpass, which was a state road and
already had a state-maintained pedestrian walkway.
U.C.A. 1953, 27-14-2.
[4] Highways <®^ 198
200 —
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel
200IX(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions
200kl98 Liabilities of Local Authorities and
Officers.
Sidewalk Construction Act does not place mandatory
duty on city to supplement state's efforts to insure
pedestrian's safety on state roads. U.C.A.1953,
27-14-2.
[5] Municipal Corporations <®^766
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(C) Defects or Obstructions in Streets and
Other Public Ways
268k765 Nature of Defects
268k766 In General.
Under the public duty doctrine, city owed no duty to
pedestrian to control transients who gathered at
stairway to pedestrian walkway along overpass, and
pedestrian could not recover for injuries which he
sustained when he chose to walk on the overpass
rather than the pedestrian walkway in order to avoid
harassment and possible physical violence by
transients.
[6] Municipal Corporations <®^723
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in General
268k723 Nature and Grounds of Liability.
Public duty doctrine applies even where
governmental immunity has been specifically waived
by statute.
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[7] Municipal Corporations <®^723
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in General
268k723 Nature and Grounds of Liability.
Public duty doctrine is a creature of the common
law and legislature could abrogate that common-law
doctrine if it chose to do so in specific terms.
[8] Municipal Corporations <@^=>741.20
268
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in General
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims for
Injury
268k741.20 Requirement as Mandatory or
Condition Precedent.
(Formerly 268k741.1(3))
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[10] Statutes <®^223.4
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k223 Construction with Reference to Other
Statutes
361k223.4 General and Special Statutes.
When two statutory provisions appear to conflict,
the more specific provision governs over the more
general provision.
[11] Highways <§^203
200 —
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel
200IX(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions
200k201 Actions for Injuries
200k203 Notice of Claim for Injury.
Statutory requirement that person suing Department
of Transportation serve notice of claim on UDOT and
the Attorney General prevails over rule of civil
procedure allowing service on the agency. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 4(e)(ll); U.C.A.1953, 63-30-12.

[See headnote text below]
[8] Municipal Corporations <®^:>742(4)
268
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in General
268k742 Actions
268k742(4) Pleading.
Statutory notice of claim is a jurisdictional
requirement and a precondition to suit; it is not an
affirmative defense which must be pled. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 8(c).
[9] Courts <®^37(2)
106 —
1061 Nature, Extent, and Exercise of Jurisdiction in
General
106k37 Waiver of Objections
106k37(2) Time of Making Objection.
[See headnote text below]
[9] Courts <®^39
106 —
1061 Nature, Extent, and Exercise of Jurisdiction in
General
106k39 Determination of Questions of Jurisdiction
in General.
Lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by any
party or the court.

[12] Highways <®^203
200 —
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel
200IX(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions
200k201 Actions for Injuries
200k203 Notice of Claim for Injury.
Claimant did not effectively comply with statute
governing service of notice of claim by serving only
the Department of Transportation and not the
Attorney General. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-12.
[13] States <®=» 197
360 —
360VI Actions
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action Against
State
360kl97 Presentation of Claim.
One-year period for filing notice of claim against
state is tolled for the duration of any legally
recognized disability.
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-12,
78-12-36.
*536 Gordon K. Jensen (Argued), Goicoechea Law
Offices, West Valley City, for appellant.
Roger F. Cutler, City Atty., Bruce R. Baird
(Argued), Asst. City Atty., Salt Lake City, R. Paul
Van Dam, Utah Atty. Gen., Brent Burnett (Argued),
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee.
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and RUSSON, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Plaintiff Nicholas Lamarr (Lamarr) appeals from a
summary judgment dismissing his negligence claims
against the Utah State Department of Transportation
(UDOT) and Salt Lake City (the City) arising out of
an accident on the North Temple overpass. We
affirm.
FACTS
On April 18, 1987, at approximately 10:30 p.m.,
Lamarr was struck by a car while walking east across
the North Temple overpass. The impact threw
Lamarr over the side of the overpass, and Lamarr
struck the ground, suffering serious, permanent
injuries.
Before the accident, Lamarr had walked west across
the overpass using the pedestrian walkway that
deposits pedestrians under the overpass. Lamarr was
frightened and harassed by transients who had
congregated under the overpass. On his return trip,
Lamarr walked along the overpass's roadway.
Lamarr claims this was necessary to avoid harassment
and possible *537 physical violence by the transients
congregated around the stairway leading to the
walkway. While walking along the roadway, an
automobile struck Lamarr throwing him over the side
of the overpass.
Lamarr brought suit against UDOT and the City.
Lamarr contends UDOT and the City were negligent
in failing to properly construct, maintain, and place
signs on the overpass. Lamarr also contends the City
negligently failed to properly "control" (FN1) the
transient population under the overpass.
After
discovery, the City and UDOT moved for summary
judgment on a number of alternative grounds. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both
UDOT and the City.
Lamarr presents four issues on appeal: (1) did the
trial court err in holding the City owed Lamarr no
duty for construction, maintenance, or placing signs
on the overpass?; (2) did the trial court err in holding
the City owed Lamarr no private duty to control the
transient population?; (3) did the trial court err in
ruling as a matter of law the City and UDOT did not
proximately cause Lamarr's injuries?; and (4) did
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the trial court err in concluding any duty of the City
to control the transient population is an immune
discretionary function, under Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-10(l)(a) (1989)?
UDOT presents two
additional issues on appeal: (1) did Lamarr's failure
to file a notice of his claim with both UDOT and the
attorney general deprive the trial court of jurisdiction
over Lamarr's claims against UDOT?, and (2) did
UDOT owe Lamarr a duty of care?
Summary judgment is proper when the record
indicates that "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Kitchen v. Cal Gas
Co., 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991). We
review the trial court's grant of summary judgment
under a "correctness" standard. Id. Thus, we accord
no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions
underlying its grant of summary judgment. Id.
We first consider whether summary judgment in
favor of the City was proper, and then turn to the
grant of summary judgment in favor of UDOT.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE CITY
[1] Lamarr raises multiple claims of error. Because
of our resolution of the duty issue, however, we need
not reach the other issues briefed on appeal. (FN2)
A. Duty Generally
[2] In Utah, a plaintiff must establish four elements
to state a claim of negligence: the defendant owed
the plaintiff a duty, defendant breached the duty
(negligence), the breach of the duty was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and there was in
fact injury. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116
(Utah 1991). Establishing the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of care is "[a]n essential element of a
negligence claim." Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d
1187, 1189 (Utah 1989). In fact, the Utah Supreme
Court recently noted that without a showing of duty, a
plaintiff cannot *538 recover. Rollins v. Petersen,
813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991). "Duty is 'a
question of whether the defendant is under any
obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff....' "
Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)
(quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 30, at 356-57 (W. Keeton 5th ed.
1984)). Whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty of care is "entirely a question of law to be
determined by the court." Id.
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B. Duty to Maintain Safe Overpass
[3] Lamarr first claims the City owed him a duty to
maintain a sidewalk on the overpass or to place on the
overpass signs that would have prevented him from
walking on the roadway. Lamarr contends this duty
inheres from the Utah Sidewalk Construction Act,
which provides:
The legislature recognizes that adequate sidewalks
and pedestrian safety devices are essential to the
general welfare of the citizens of the state. It is the
opinion of the legislature that existing sidewalks
within the state, especially in the most populated
areas, are not adequate to service the walking public
with a result of creating unnecessary hazards to
pedestrian and vehicular traffic.
Utah Code Ann. § 27-14-2 (1989). Section 27-14-2
further states: "It is the intent of this act to provide a
means whereby a portion of the funds received by the
counties and participating cities as B and C road
funds may be used for the construction of curbs,
gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices
pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this act." Id.
(emphasis added). Lamarr argues this statute imposes
a mandatory duty on the City to construct a sidewalk
on the overpass, even though Lamarr admits the
overpass is a state road and already has a statemaintained pedestrian walkway. We disagree.
In construing statutes, we are bound to "assume that
each term of a statute was used advisedly; and that
each should be given an interpretation and application
in accord with their [sic] usually accepted meaning,
unless the context otherwise requires." Grant v. Utah
State Land Bd., 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035,
1036 (1971). In Grant, the court construed a
forfeiture statute providing that the State Land Board
" 'may reinstate' " a previously forfeited land sales
contract. Id., 485 P.2d at 1036 (quoting Utah Code
Ann. § 65-1-47 (1953)). The plaintiff contended
section 65-1-47 "vest[ed] in him the absolute right to
reinstate a forfeited certificate." Id. The court
disagreed, holding the word "may" is not mandatory
but only permissive. Id.
[4] Based on the plain meaning of the statute, we
hold the Utah Sidewalk Construction Act does not
place a mandatory duty on the City to supplement the
State's efforts to ensure pedestrian safety on state
roads. Thus, the City had no duty to maintain or
construct a sidewalk on the overpass or to place signs
on the overpass that would have prevented Lamarr
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from walking across the roadway. Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in granting the City summary
judgment on this duty issue. (FN3)
C. Public Duty Doctrine
[5] Lamarr also claims the City owed him a duty to
"control" the transient population beneath the
overpass. The trial court held the City did not owe
Lamarr such a duty. We agree with the trial court,
and hold that under the public duty doctrine, the City
owed no duty to Lamarr to "control" transients.
Under the public duty doctrine,
[f]or a governmental agency and its agents to be
liable for negligently caused injury suffered by a
member of the public, *539 the plaintiff must show
a breach of a duty owed him as an individual, not
merely the breach of an obligation owed to the
general public at large by the governmental official.
Feme, 784 P.2d at 151 (citing Obray v. Malmberg,
26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971)). The
public duty doctrine has been defined as "a duty to all
is a duty to none." Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1165
(Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Thus, if the City owed no duty to Lamarr apart
from its duty to the general public, Lamarr cannot
recover. See Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152.
The Utah Supreme Court recently explained the
parameters of Utah's public duty doctrine. See id.
In Ferree, the court applied the public duty doctrine
holding state corrections officials were not liable
when a prison inmate on weekend release murdered
Dean Ferree. Id. at 151-52. The court concluded
the officials had only a general duty to the public, not
a private duty to Ferree, and therefore owed Ferree
no duty of care. Id. Moreover, in Rollins, 813 P.2d
1156, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment because under the public duty
doctrine, the State did not owe a duty to protect the
decedent from a state hospital patient. Id. at 1161-62.
The court specifically noted the decedent "was simply
a member of the public, no more distinguishable to
the hospital than to any other person." Id. at 1162.
[6] [7] Lamarr contends "[t]he public duty doctrine
has no application where governmental immunity has
specifically been waived by statute."
The Utah
Supreme Court has clearly rejected Lamarr's theory.
(FN4) The specific question of the effect of waiver
of immunity on the public duty doctrine was
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addressed in Feme. In rejecting a claim similar to
Lamarr's, the court stated:
Sovereign immunity, however, is an affirmative
defense and conceptually arises subsequent to the
question of whether there is tort liability in the first
instance. There is sound reason and desirable
simplicity in analyzing and applying negligence
concepts before deciding issues of sovereign
immunity....
"... Conceptually, the question of the applicability
of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is
determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty
of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in
the absence of such immunity."
Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152-53 (quoting Davidson v.
City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-02, 649 P.2d
894, 896, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 254 (1982)).
The Utah Supreme Court recently affirmed its
decision and reasoning in Ferree. In Rollins, 813
P.2d 1156, the estate of a decedent killed in an
accident with a stolen automobile driven by a state
hospital patient brought a wrongful death action
against, among others, the State. Id. at 1158. The
trial court granted the State's motion for summary
judgment concluding the State had no duty to the
decedent other than its duty to the general public. Id.
On appeal, the court again addressed the question of
whether the legislature's abrogation of immunity
abolished the public duty doctrine. Once again
answering this question in the negative, the court
explained:
[T]he legislature's abrogation of absolute sovereign
immunity does not lead to the conclusion that the
public duty doctrine has also been abrogated.
Legislative recognition of a right to recover from
one who has previously been immune from liability
for tortious acts cannot logically be read as an
elimination of the requirement that before one can
recover damages from another, a tort must be
proven. There must still be *540 proof of a duty
owed to the one claiming injury and a breach of that
duty.
Therefore, in the present case, as in any tort case,
the proper mode of analysis is to first consider
whether there is a legal theory upon which suit can
be brought ... before considering the separate and
independent question of whether the [governmental
agency] is immune.
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Id. at 1162 n. 3 (emphasis added); see also Kirk v.
State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah App. 1989) (to
reach immunity issue, court must assume duty and
negligence).
Based on the preceding authority, Lamarr must
establish the City owed him a "special duty." See
Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151. We conclude Lamarr has
failed to establish the City owed him any duty of care
beyond that owed the general public. There is no
evidence in the record the City had any reason to
distinguish Lamarr from the general public. Like the
decedent in Rollins, Lamarr "had not set himself
apart" from the general public such that any special
duty arose between himself and the City. In fact,
there is no evidence the City had any knowledge
whatsoever of either of Lamarr's trips across the
overpass. (FN5)
In summary, we hold the City owed Lamarr no duty
of care. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of the City.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR UDOT
UDOT moved for summary judgment on grounds
Lamarr failed to file notice of his claim within one
year with both UDOT and the Utah Attorney General
as required by the waiver provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-12 (1989). Although the issue was fully
briefed, the trial court did not reach the notice issue.
Rather, the trial court ruled in favor of UDOT on its
proximate cause claim. On appeal, UDOT asserts
these alternative grounds upon which we can affirm
the trial court's summary judgment: absence of
proper notice, proximate cause, or duty of care owed
to Lamarr. Because of our resolution of the threshold
notice issue, we do not reach the proximate cause and
duty issues.
A. Notice of Claim is Jurisdictional
[8] Lamarr first claims the notice issue is not
properly before this court. Lamarr asserts the notice
issue is an affirmative defense that was not pleaded in
the answer, and thus Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure precludes UDOT from raising it in its
summary judgment motion and on appeal. Lamarr
notes UDOT never mentions the term "notice of
claim" in its answer. He further argues UDOT did
not request the court to rule on this issue on summary
judgment and therefore we cannot consider it on
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appeal. Lamarr's argument, however, misconstrues
the nature of the statutory notice of claim
requirement. Lamarr erroneously asserts the notice
of claim provision is a statute of limitation. Rather,
the supreme court has held the statutory notice
requirement is a jurisdictional requirement and a
precondition to suit. See Madsen v. Borthick, 769
P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988).
[9] Lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by
any party or the court. Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch.
Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986). Therefore,
Lamarr's contention that the notice issue is not
properly before this court fails. In fact, Rule 12(h)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires this
court to dismiss the claim against UDOT if the trial
court lacked jurisdiction.
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and UDOT, and Lamarr admits he never filed notice
with the attorney general. (FN6)
[13] Moreover, the supreme court has indicated that
actual notice cannot cure a failure to comply with the
nptiepTJmvisieSS^t the Governmental Immunity Act.
In (Varoz v. SeveyX29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435
(19<^L1_Jhej^pHield a plaintiff's minority did not
excuse failure to comply with a statute requiring
timely notice of a claim against a county. Id., 506
P.2d at 436. (FN7) Significantly for the present
case, the supreme court held that the county's actual
notice of the claim did not satisfy the statute:
[f]rom the language of the statute it is quite clear
that the legislature intended to make the filing of a
timely notice of claim prerequisite to maintaining an
action.

B. Notice of Claim Under Section 63-30-12
[10][11] First, Lamarr claims Rule 4(e)(ll) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows him to effect
notice by serving only UDOT, and not the attorney
general. *541 Section 63-30-12, however, is more
specific than Rule 4 in that the former requires notice
on UDOT and the attorney general. When two
statutory provisions appear to conflict, the more
specific provision governs over the more general
provision. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.,
681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984). Thus, section
63-30-12 is the applicable rule at issue, not Rule 4.
To invoke the trial court's jurisdiction over UDOT,
Lamarr was required to comply with section 63-30-12
, the more specific jurisdictional rule.
Next, Lamarr argues he has "effectively" complied
"with section 63-30-12 by serving notice only on
UDOT. Lamarr points out the attorney general's
office had actual notice of Lamarr's claims within the
one-year period. Thus, Lamarr argues the intent of
the statute was satisfied.
[12] In construing section 60-30-12, the supreme
court has stated: "Section 63-30-12 provides that an
action against the State is barred if the required notice
is not filed. It therefore makgs^tee^Q^ive notice
grounds for dismissal. A (plain readin^^yiiost
sections indicates that no suit against me statemay be
maintained if notice is not given." Madsen, 769 P.2d
at 249 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The
importance of Madsen for Lamarr's case is the
supreme court's application of "[a] plain reading" of
section 60-30-12. Id. The plain language of section
60-30-12 requires notice both to the attorney general

Actual knowledge of the circumstances which
resulted in the death of the plaintiff's mother by
officials of the county does not dispense with the
necessity of filing a timely claim.
*542. Id. (FN8)
Requiring written notice to both UDOT and the
attorney general is consistent with cases interpreting
notice statutes similar to section 60-30-12. For
example, Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531
P.2d 480 (Utah 1975), involved a companion statute
to section 63-30-12, section 63-30-13. Section
63-30-13 is identical to section 63-30-12 except that
the former applies to political subdivisions, whereas
the latter applies to state agencies. In Scarborough,
the trial court dismissed a complaint against Granite
School District because the plaintiff had not filed
notice with the school district and the attorney
general. Id. at 481. The supreme court, affirming
the dismissal, explained:
The School District is a political subdivision of the
state. Therefore it would normally be immune from
suit; and the right to sue is an exception created by
statute. We have consistently held that where a
cause of action is based upon a statute, full
compliance with its requirements is a condition
precedent to the right to maintain a suit.
Id. at 482 (footnotes omitted).
Applying a plain reading, we hold section 63-30-12
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required Lamarr to serve written notice of his claim
on both UDOT and the attorney general within one
year of his injuries. Lamarr failed to serve the
attorney general within the specified time, thus
depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over Lamarr's
claims against UDOT. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court's dismissal of Lamarr's claims against
UDOT.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold the trial court did not err in concluding as a
matter of law that the City owed Lamarr no duty of
care. Further, we hold Lamarr's failure to comply
with the notice provision of the Governmental
Immunity Act deprived the trial court of jurisdiction
over Lamarr's claims against UDOT.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
JACKSON and RUSSON, JL, concur.
(FN1.) Although we find Lamarr's use of the term
"control" in reference to the City's transient
population troublesome, to directly address
Lamarr's claims we repeat that term here.
(FN2.) Lamarr also argues the trial court improperly
reconsidered the question of the City's duty to
Lamarr. Lamarr correctly notes the trial court
denied the City's first motion for summary judgment
asserting the City owed Lamarr no duty of care.
The trial court granted summary judgment only after
the City made a second motion for summary
judgment. Lamarr claims the trial court's earlier
denial of the City's first motion for summary
judgment precluded the trial court from revisiting
the duty issue.
Lamarr ignores the well-established rule that "
'[a]ny judge is free to change his or her mind on the
outcome of a case until a decision is formally
rendered.' " Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah
App. 1988) (quoting Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d
757, 760 (Utah 1985)). "[A] trial court is not
inexorably bound by its own precedents...." Id.
The trial court is free to reconsider its earlier
decision, especially when, as here, a party supports
a second motion for summary judgment with
additional evidence.
This rule has particular
application in cases that, like this one, involve
multiple parties and multiple claims. Id. at 44 n. 5.
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Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in
considering the City's second motion for summary
judgment.
(FN3.) We emphasize our resolution of the duty
issue is fact specific. There is no dispute the
overpass is a state highway. Thus, any duty of the
City to maintain that highway must be a statutory
duty, and our analysis focuses on that issue. Our
resolution of this issue in no way addresses the
existence or scope of the City's duty to safely
maintain its streets.
Because we hold the City had no duty to construct
or place signs on the overpass, we need not reach
the issue of whether that duty is a public or private
duty under the public duty doctrine.
(FN4.) The public duty doctrine is a creature of the
common law.
Lamarr basically argues the
legislature abrogated the common law doctrine in
enacting the Governmental Immunity Act. Although
the supreme court in Ferree and Rollins expressly
rejects this argument, we note the legislature could
abrogate that common law doctrine if it chose to do
so in specific terms. Cf. Norton v. Macfarlane, 818
P.2d «, 12 (Utah 1991) (legislature has last word
with respect to tort law).
*542__ (FN5.) This conclusion is also supported by
the supreme court's decision in Little v. Utah State
Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah
1983). In that case, the court held that once a State
agency took custody of an autistic child and placed
the child in a foster home, the agency assumed a
duty of due care to the child. Id. at 51. It was only
after the agency had knowledge of the child's
condition and assumed custody of the child,
however, that the special relationship arose between
the agency and child. Id.
(FN6.) Recently, in Kabwasa v. University of Utah,
785 F.Supp. 1445 (D.Utah 1990) (Memorandum
Decision and Order), Judge Green of the United
States Court for the District of Utah interpreted
section 63-30-12 to require notice to both the
attorney general and the agency. A party brought
several claims, including state law claims, against
the University of Utah. That party, however, failed
to comply with section 63-30-12 and gave notice
only to the attorney general and not to the
University of Utah. The University of Utah claimed
the party's failure to comply with section 63-30-12
by giving both the University and attorney general
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828 P.2d 535, Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transp., (Utah App. 1992)
notice deprived the court of jurisdiction.
Green ruled:

Judge

The court agrees with the defendants that the plain
meaning of section 63-30-12 requires that two
notices of claim should have been filed by plaintiff:
one to the Attorney General and one to the
University of Utah.
Although this statutory
requirement may result in redundant notice being
given, such redundancy apparently is mandated by
the statute inasmuch as the Utah Attorney General is
the agent and legal counsel for all state agencies,
including the University of Utah. In this pendant
state law claim, the court is unwilling to ignore the
unambiguous language of the Utah statute requiring
two separate notices, especially where the Utah
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that strict
compliance with the notice of claim provision is
essential to maintain a suit pursuant to the
Governmental Immunity Act.
Id. at 1446-47.
(FN7.) We note Varoz was impliedly overruled by
the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1992)
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(enacted in 1975 and amended in 1987). That
section provides "the time of [a] disability is not a
part of the time limited for the commencement of
the action." Id. In Scott v. School Board of Granite
School District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), the court
held this section applies to the notice provisions of
the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at 748. Thus,
the one-year period for filing notice under section
63-30-12 is tolled for the duration of any legally
recognized disability.
Section 78-12-36, as
interpreted by Scott, however, provides Lamarr no
support as he has not relied on that section and does
not claim a disability prevented him from filing
notice with the attorney general.
(FN8.) See also Edwards v. Iron County ex rel.
Valley View Medical Ctr.y 531 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah
1975) (even if county employees had actual
knowledge of plaintiffs injuries, plaintiff cannot
dispense with notice requirement); Lando v. City of
Chicago, 128 Ill.App.3d 597, 83 Ill.Dec. 752, 755,
470 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 (1984) (where required
notice was defective, actual notice supplied by thirdparty (paramedics) did not satisfy statute).

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

4

xliiiuuica v. u 1*111 oiaic UUIYCIMIY

coae-uo
Provo, Utah

417 Utah Adv. Rep. 4
future. Following those equivocal answers, follow-up I
questions revealed that resolving the mother's 1. At oral argument, Appellants cited In re D.LS., 332
problems would take a "significant amount of time," N.W2d 293 (Wis. 1983). The court in In re D.LS.,
and that the father felt the children "deserve a lot however, merely applied the Wisconsin statutory
more than I can give them right now." Then, requirements for voluntary relinquishment of parental
Appellants both unequivocally agreed that rights, which include an explicit right to a jury trial if
requested by the relinquishing parent. See id at 296 n.5. In
relinquishment and adoption into a loving and stable re D.LS. does not stand for the proposition that due process
environment was in the children's best interests. requires a court to comply with Rule 11 in voluntary
Given this testimony, the family's extensive history relinquishment cases
with the Division of Child and Family Services, and 2. Although a conclusion on the best interest of the children
the nature of Appellants' personal problems, we is included in the juvenile court's findings of fact, such a
conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its determination is "more properly labeled a conclusion of
discretion in determining that termination of parental law." In re SLA 999 UT App 390 at 130 n 6
rights was in the children's best interests.
3. Rule 60(b)(6) is "sufficiently broad" to permit a court to
^[8 Appellants finally assert that they were denied set aside a judgment for ineffective assistance of counsel
effective assistance of counsel. JIn their briefs on Stewart v Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d 156, 158, 506 P.2d 74, 76
appeal, Appellants' only argument oh this issue is a (1973)
terse assertion, without citation to the record or any
legal authority, that counsels' "superficial and cursory
Cite as
examination of [Appellants]" constituted ineffective
417 Utah Adv. Rep. 4
assistance of counsel because it prevented them from
both expressing their true feelings and demonstrating
IN THE
"on record that [they] had an adequate,
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
understanding" of the proceeding and its
consequences. Rule 24(9) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure requires that all arguments Amanda THIMMES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
contain "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on." Id Because Appellants have v.
failed to cite to the record and any legal authority in , UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, Haven B.
support of their ineffective assistance claim, we could Hendricks, and John Does I-X,
Defendants and Appellees.
properly refuse to consider it. See State v. Thomas,
1999 UT 2,111, 974 R2d 269.
^9 In any event, the argument fails on its merits. No.991099-CA
Appellants firsf raised their ineffective assistance FILED: 03/15/01
claim in their post- judgment motion urider Rule 2001 UT App 93
60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.3 To
establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, First District, Logan Department
an appellant must show that "counsel's performance The Honorable Gordon J. Low
was objectively deficient and that counsels deficient
performance prejudiced the case." In re Eft., 880 ATTORNEYS:
Randall K. Edwards, Salt Lake City, for
P.2ci 11, 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 'Appellants' only
contention in their briefs on appeal is that counsels' Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brent A. Burnett, Salt Lake
examinations of Appellants during the relinquishment
proceeding were inadequate. Even assuming that City, for Appellees
counsels' examinations were objectively deficient,
Appellants were not 'prejudiced. The record Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Thorne>
establishes that the requirements ofsection 78-3 a-414
ThiSiQpinion is subject to revision before
were met. In addition, Appelldhts were gi^en an
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
opportunity to ask questions at the hearing, and they
were asked to explain in their own words why
termination of parental rights and adoption was in the BENCH, Judge:
Children's best interests. Thus, the juvenile court did % 1 Appellant argues that the trial court erred whenit
not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' Rule granted Appellees' Motion to Dismiss after
60(b) motion. See Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110,19, 2 P.3d 451 because of Appellant's failure to properly serve a
(establishing abuse of discretion as the proper notice of claim on the Utah Attorney General. We
standard of review for denial of Rule 60(b) motions). j affirm.
BACKGROUND
110
We affirm the juvenile court's orders
terminating Appellants' parental rights and denying \2 On March 17, 1997, Appellant was struck by a
vehicle operated by Appellee Haven B. Hendricks, an
their post-judgment motions.
employee of Appellee Utah State University.
\
Appellant prepared a complaint against Appellees for
Russell W. Bench, Judge
damages resulting from the accident Pursuant to t^e
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Appellant
111
WE CONCUR:
prepared two notices of claim to be served in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (1997).l
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding
An employee of Appellant's attorney sent one notice
Judith M. Billings, Judge
of claim to Utah State University and called the
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Dffice of the Utah Attorney General (Attorney in part: "A claim against the state.,. is barred unless
jeneral) to inquire as to whom the other notice notice of claim isfiledwith the attorney general ajxd
ihqjjfdfte sent. After being transferred, the employee the agency concerned within one year after the claim
;pdke to an unidentified person who allegedly told arises.n Id. (emphasis added). Section 63-30-12 does
ler to send the notice to the Division of Risk not contain the same ambiguities as to whom the
Management The employee mailed a notice of claim notice of claim should be directed as sections
to the Division of Risk Management on February 6, 63-30-11 and -13. An individual makings claim
1998.
against the State need not infer which governmental
|3 In January 1999, Appellant filed her complaint entity should be served with notice—the statute gives
against Appellees in the First District Court. The explicit directions. Any confusion over who should
Attprriey General subsequently filed a Motion to receive the notice was created by Appellant when she
Dismiss, alleging that the bffice had not been elected to rely *on advice from an unnamed state
properly served with a notice of "claim pursuant to employee; -rather than 'the plain language of the
section 63-30-12. The trial court held a hearing and statute.
granted the motion to dismiss. Appellant filed a \l Appellant would also have us conclude that the
motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. Division of Risk Management is an office of the
This appeal followed.
Attorney General because an assistant attorney
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
general maintains an office * there. However, in
f4 The issue before us is whether the trial court Siraley, we recognized that * while* notice *"to the
properly dismissed Appellant's complaint after Division of Risk Management may be "sufficient to
finding thatishe had not complied with the notice of comply with . .. [the] requirement that the notice of
claim requirements in section 63-30-12. '"The grant claim also be filed with the agency concerned,... it
of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed cannot sufficefor the Immunity Act's requirement that
under the same standard as the grant of a motion tp notice be filed with the Attorney General** Straley,
dismiss, i.e., we affirm the grant of such a motion 2000 UT App 38 atf 16 n.9 (internal citation omitted)
only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not (emphasis added).
recover under the facts alleged."1 Siraley v. Haltiday, \% Finally, Appellant contends that this case falls
2000 UT App 38,^8,997 P.2d 33 8'(quoting Gdlding within the exception to the general rule that
v.'Ashley Cent. Ir'rigattont CfcJ*793, P.2d 89*7, 898 "precludes the assertion of estoppel against the
(Utah 1990)). The grant ofimbtiQnto dismiss is thus government." Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646
a matter of law1, which "we review for correctness." P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982). The exception to this
Id.
general rule, -however, applies only in cases where
ANALYSIS
"the facts may be found with such certainty, and the
%5 Appellant relies on Bischel v. Metritt, 907 P.2d injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to
l
275 (Utah€t. App. 1995) to support her contention invoke the exception^" Id. The exception requires "a
that she complied with the requirements for filing a high standard of prdof' and has only applied in cases
notice of claim. Btowever, wrf conclude that the, involving "very specific written representations by
circumstances in Bischel are easily distinguished from authorized government entities." Anderson v. Public
this case. In Bischel, we recognized the established Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992). No
rule of strict compliance with the notice provisions of written representation was involved in this case, and
tfie Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See id. at 279. Appellant cannot even name the state employee on
We also acknowledged ambiguities in Utah Code whose advice she relied. Appellant does not allege,
Ann. §§63-30-11,-13 (1993) because they did not and we can find no indication of, willful misconduct
"prescribe a specific manner or method for filing on the government's part nor an intent to hinder
notice with the governing body of the political Appellant's pursuit of her claim. Thus, we conclude
subdivision." Bischel, 907 P.2d at 278. Specifically, that Appellant falls far short of meeting the high
we concluded that "direction and delivery of the standard of proof required for us to apply estoppel in
notice must be inferred from the phrase, 'notice of this case.
claim is filed with the governing body of the political
CONCLUSION
subdivision within one year after the claim arises.'" ^9 Appellant has not presented sufficient evidence to
Id. (quoting Utah Code Anh. § 63-30-13 (1993)). justify her reliance on the advice of an unnamed state
Because the statute did not specify to whom Bischel employee rather than the plain language of section
was to direct her notice of claim, we concluded that 63-30-12. Appellant did not strictly comply with the
she could rely on representations of an employee of notice requirements of section 63-30-12 because she
the county attorney's office that she could direct her failed to serve notice of her claim on the Attorney
notice to that office. See id. In Bellonio v Salt Lake General within the specified time period. Therefore,
City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) we the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider
explained the effect of Bischel on the general rule Appellant's claim and we affirm the dismissal of her
requiring strict compliance with the Governmental complaint.
Immunity Act. We pointed to the unique factual
circumstances of Bischel andsaid our decision in that
Russell W. Bench, Judge
case should not be viewed as an" abrogation of] the
long-standing rule requiring strict compliance withall flO
WE CONCUR:
aspects of the Governmental Immunity Act."
5e//omo,911P.2datl297.
James Z. Davis, Judge
H6 In this case, Appellant's claim is against the State,
William A, Thorne, Jr., Judge
rxnt tVui rmintv This case is therefore governed by
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1. At the time Appellant's claim arose, section 63-30-12
required that notice be served on "the attorney general and
the agency concerned." Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (1997).
Subsequently, section 63-30-12 has been revised to require
that a notice of claim be served only on the Attorney
General. See Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (Supp. 2000).
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
ONE 1980 CADILLAC and Three Thousand, Six
Hundred, Seventy Six Dollars U.S. Currency,
Defendant,
Rick Dee Keebler,
Appellant.
No. 990382
FILED: 03/16/01
2001 UT 26
Sixth District, Sevier County
The Honorable David L. Mower
ATTORNEYS:
R. Don Brown, Richfield, for plaintiff
Rick Dee Keebler, Leavenworth, Kansas, pro se
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
DURHAM, Justice:
K1 Appellant Rick Dee Keebler ("Keebler") appeals
pro se from the trial court's judgment, pursuant to the
Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-13(1998), ordering forfeiture of his 1980
Cadillac and $3676 in United States currency to the
State of Utah. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
\2 On September 20, 1994, while driving a 1980
Cadillac in Sevier County, Utah, Keebler was stopped
by the Utah Highway Patrol for a traffic offense. A
search of the vehicle revealed that Keebler was
transporting large quantities of controlled substances,
including methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and
marijuana. The officer arrested Keebler and seized the
1980 Cadillac and $3676 cash found in Keebler's
possession. Keebler was subsequently charged and
convicted under federal drug charges. Throughout
this litigation, he has been incarcerated and continues
to serve as an inmate in federal prison.
f 3 On September 30, 1994, the State of Utah filed a
complaint and notice of seizure and forfeiture in the
Sixth Judicial District Court in Sevier County. In the
complaint, the state alleged that the 1980 Cadillac and
the $3676 were being used or intended for use to
facilitate the transportation, receipt, possession,
and/or concealment of illegal narcotics in violation of
the Utah Controlled Substances Act. Therefore, the
state urged forfeiture of Keebler's property. Keebler
answered the complaint and denied the state's
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allegations.
^[4 No further action was taken in this matter unti
May 27, 1998, when the state moved for summan
judgment. After Keebler opposed the motion, the tria
court denied summary judgment because the use o
the seized currency was in dispute. Subsequently
while still incarcerated, Keebler moved for fina
disposition of the matter.
f5 A scheduling conference was held on Decembe
8,1998, at which Keebler appeared via telephone. A
that time, the court scheduled a bench trial for Marcl
23,1999. About one month before the scheduled tria
date, Keebler petitioned the trial court for an orde
requiring the State of Utah to bear the cost o
transporting him to appear and testify at the trial
However, the trial court did not act on the motion anc
the bench trial was held as scheduled. Keebler, stil
incarcerated, was not present or represented at th<
trial.
f 6 After trial, the court made findings of fact that a
the time of Keebler's arrest, he possessed and wai
transporting large quantities of narcotics for illega
distribution, including 8 pounds o
methamphetamine, 1 kilogram of cocaine, 5 ounces o
heroin, and 11.5 pounds of marijuana. The trial cour
found that Keebler actually admitted his intent tc
break the narcotics down into small quantities and sel
them illegally for an anticipated return of $175,000
In addition, the trial court found that Keeblei
admitted he had previously purchased and distributee
for profit other illegal narcotics, including 2 poundi
of methamphetamine, 1 kilogram of cocaine, 2 ounce*
of heroin, and 6 pounds of marijuana. Based on these
findings of fact, the court concluded that the 198(
Cadillac was being used to transport narcotics anc
that the currency constituted proceeds of narcotic!
distribution in violation of the Utah Controllec
Substances Act. The trial court ordered that the 198(
Cadillac and the $3676 be forfeited to the state.
1[7 On appeal, Keebler raises three claims of error
He argues that (1) the trial court's judgmen
constitutes double jeopardy because Keebler1!
conviction on federal drug charges is based on th(
same conduct relevant to the forfeiture proceeding
(2) the trial court's judgment violates Keebler's righ
to due process of law because the state did not beai
the cost of transporting him to Utah to appear at th<
trial and did not appoint counsel to represent him, anc
(3) the trial court did not have subject mattei
jurisdiction in the forfeiture proceeding because
Keebler was convicted under federal jurisdiction anc
was not charged under the Utah Controllec
Substances Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
TJ8 The trial court's judgment contained no express
conclusions of law with regard to Keebler's claims o
error. However, the inference _ inherent in the
judgment is that the trial court found no merit tc
Keebler's constitutional and jurisdictional arguments
Keebler's constitutional arguments regarding double
jeopardy and due process present questions ofjaw
State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five ThousandJEigh
Hundred Dollars, United States Currency, and One
Scale, 942 P.2d 343,346 (Utah 1997) (citing Ryan v
Gold Cross Servs, Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utaf
1995)). Subject matter jurisdiction is also a questior
of law. Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917,91S
(Utah 1993) (citing Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2c
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